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BACKGROUND AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
The citizens of Washington and Oregon today face a number of important environmental 
challenges. For example, a majority of streams fail to meet water quality standards, that 
streamflows in many waterbodies in the region often do not have sufficient water to sustain 
fisheries during the dry season, and that many salmon stocks are listed as threatened or 
endangered regionwide. In addition, the Oregon State of the Environment Report, published in 
2001 by the Oregon progress Board, identified a number of areas where Oregonians can expect 
continued problems under current policies and programs including: poor water quality, especially 
in urban and agricultural areas, inadequate water supplies, loss of wetlands, degraded riparian 
areas, depleted fish stocks, invasion of exotic species, diminished biodiversity, and waste and 
toxic releases. Similar problems exist in Washington State. 
 
These environmental issues threaten the quality-of-life of communities throughout the Pacific 
Northwest. The public and decision makers want to take appropriate steps to resolve these 
problems, but often hesitate because they fear the economic consequences will be too severe.  
 
In the spring of 1999, The Center for Watershed and Community Health (CWCH), a research 
institute affiliated with the University of Oregon Institute for a Sustainable Environment 
(formerly affiliated with the Mark O. Hatfield School of Government at Portland State 
University), initiated a project to help decision makers throughout the region better understand 
the economic issues and facts associated with developing a more environmentally sustainable 
economy. The CWCH’s aims is to provide accurate, objective, and easy-to-understand 
information about the potential costs and benefits associated with adopting practices and policies 
that can resolve pressing problems such as endangered salmon and lead to a more efficient 
economy. The CWCH has developed collaborative research partnerships with a number of 
academic institutions in Washington and Oregon, provides grants to a number of leading 
economists, and completes its own research, to accomplish this goal.  This assessment is one in a 
series of reports to be produced as a result of this effort. The project is an integral part of PSU 
CWCH’s focus on developing new, more effective and efficient approaches to environmental 
governance. 
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I. Background and Introduction 
 
This paper is intended to outline a framework and provide policy recommendations for 
expanding the tools and approaches available to transfer water between out-of-stream and 
instream uses and also among out-of-stream uses. The document is an outcome of a multi-year 
effort to assess the costs and benefits of water acquisition strategies, begun in 2000 by the PSU 
(now UO) Center for Watershed and Community Health. The report suggests that one key to 
expanding water transfers in the region is to frame the goal, when possible, as a means to help all 
users of water—both farmers and other water right holders—to meet their objectives. This 
approach may be viewed more positively than ones which has at times been interpreted by some 
agricultural interests as involving only costs without any offsetting benefits for them or their 
communities.  
 
The project began with the publication of Increasing Stream Flows to Sustain Salmon in the 
Northwest: An Economic and Policy Assessment (Jaeger and Mikesell for the PSU CWCH, 
2000). This report identified the broad outlines of a strategy to protect and enhance streamflows 
in the Northwest by purchasing or leasing irrigators’ water rights. The report suggested that 
acquiring water to increase streamflows in all years and/or at all times of the year will frequently 
be unnecessary if:  a) the benefits to fish come from maintaining a minimum streamflow during 
critical months, and b) the critical minimum streamflow is currently being achieved in some, and 
perhaps most, years. The report emphasized the potential use of contingent contracts to reduce 
the costs of water transfers in a flexible manner that increases the benefits for irrigators. Using 
data from market transactions for individual water rights, sales of irrigated farmland, and from a 
number of economic studies and cost estimation techniques, the report found that the costs of 
acquiring water to augment streamflow are likely to be modest if an efficient approach, such as 
the use of contingent contracts, is taken. Costs were estimated to be between $1 and $25 per acre-
foot, which would translate into annual costs of between $1 and $10 per person in Washington 
and Oregon for a comprehensive program.  
 
Following the publication of this first report, Jim Waldo, water policy advisor to Washington 
Governor Locke, asked the CWCH to analyze strategies to assist efforts to increase streamflows 
in Washington during the 2001 draught in a manner that could help economically distressed 
farmers. In response to this request, we reviewed 2000 and 2001 water acquisitions by the 
Washington Department of Ecology, the Roza Irrigation District, and U.S. Bureau of 
Reclamation. This review found that if specific changes were made to the way leases were 
advertised, solicited, acquired, held and monitored, water leasing could be a very viable short 
and long-term approach to resolve water shortage problems and economic problems faced by 
certain farmers. One key finding was that water right holders seem to be most comfortable 
leasing water rights to other farmers or irrigation districts. The review also found that the long-
term monitoring of leases must involve more than visual approaches. In addition, we found that 
increased communication and outreach were needed to gain better awareness within the irrigated 
community of the opportunities for, and benefits of, water leasing. For more information see 
Assessment Of Water Leasing Activities In Washington State (PSU Center for Watershed and 
Community Health, November 1, 2001).   
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In addition to our review of 2001 water acquisition activities, we produced an initial economic 
model to guide water transfers (see Streamflow Augmentation Strategy: Initial Framework and 
Economic Model, Bob Doppelt & William Jaeger for the PSU CWCH, November 1, 2001).  
 
This paper, Benefits to Fish, Benefits to Farmers: Improving Streamflow and Water Allocation in 
the Northwest, builds on our previous work. It seeks to provide a framework for encouraging 
water transfers in a way that expands the opportunities for farmers and other water-right holders 
to achieving their own economic goals, rather than viewing transfers as an infringement on their 
economic well-being.  
 
 
II. The Need for an Inclusive Approach and an Expanded Framework 
 
 A fundamental assumption behind any effective water transfer/market system is that 
voluntary transactions must benefit both buyer and seller (or leaser and lessee), and that 
obstacles that block voluntary transactions limit the ability of individuals, and society generally, 
to get the most benefit from water. Of course, there are exceptions to this rule, situations where 
individuals other than the buyer or seller are affected beneficially or adversely, and these kinds 
of situations arise due to the special characteristics of water that make it different from other 
commodities and other markets. Indeed, the depletion of instream flows and fish population is a 
direct result of one of these special characteristics.  
 
Water transfers in the form of leases, purchases, dry-year options, split-season contracts, 
or water banks involve the creation of markets where market activity has historically been 
absent. Water transfers therefore represent a new market, one that is unlikely to function well in 
its nascent stages, but one where, with some attention to those aspects of markets which foster 
efficiency, could function well in the future.  
 
Economic theory includes a well-developed way of thinking about the necessary 
conditions for markets to function efficiently. The principles from this analytical framework can 
be easily applied to water for identifying currently existing obstacles, and also for pointing out 
the direction of possible policy solutions or other remedies.  
 
Standard economic theory finds that efficiency (defined here as the absence of waste) 
will occur in a strict sense only if eight conditions hold with respect to property rights and 
markets. Four of these conditions pertain to ensuring that non-attenuated property rights exist 
and the other four conditions pertain to ensuring that markets are perfectly competitive. Of 
course, none of these conditions holds perfectly in the real world, but the closer we are to these 
conditions the more efficiently a market is likely to function.  The obstacles which currently 
constrain water transfers in the Pacific Northwest involve shortcomings related to all eight of 
these conditions. The eight conditions are:  
   
1. Individual Ownership, Control, Impact. Ownership rights must be exclusive, that 
is all rewards and penalties from any action involving the resource will accrue 
directly to the individual empowered to take that action—the owner. No other 
individual is affected by the owner’s actions.  
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2. Completely Specified Rights. The rights associated with ownership must be 
completely specified so that there is perfect information about the ownership rights, 
the restrictions on those rights, and the penalties for their violation.  
 
3. Transferable Rights. The rights must be transferable so that through markets the use 
of the resource may gravitate to their highest-value use (this implicitly assumes 
transaction costs are zero).  
 
4. Complete Enforcement. The rights must be completely enforced (and at zero 
enforcement cost).  
 
The second set of four conditions for efficient (“perfectly competitive”) markets being: 
 
5. Standardized Product. The products being sold in a given market must be identical; 
there must be no differentiation (e.g., with respect to quality, timing, access) across 
buyers, sellers, or locations.  
 
6. Perfect Information. All information is available at zero cost to buyers and sellers. 
 
7. No Market Power. No individual buyer or seller can influence the price; their role is 
too small in relation to the size of the market to influence the price.  
 
8. Other Resources Are Mobile. Any other resource, factor or input used in 
combination with the good being marketed can be moved to other locations and put to 
other, equally valuable uses.  
 
The first of these conditions provides an explanation for the under-provision of instream 
uses: the benefits of increasing streamflows for protection of fish population, recreation, and 
other benefits due not accrue to specific individuals, rather they represent “public goods” from 
which we all may benefit but for which none of us can be easily compelled to pay. Therein lies 
the problem of inadequate instream flows, and the decline of fish populations in the Northwest.  
 
Our research suggests, however, that this problem can be overcome in certain locations 
and at certain times by not focusing exclusively on how to increase instream flows, but to also 
look generally at water allocation and the obstacles for reallocating water in ways that would 
generate more public benefits as well as more individual benefits.  
 
The reasons for this focus are several. First, there are many examples of inefficient water 
allocation, and removing the obstacles to reallocation of water can generate large benefits from 
water in several kinds of uses, not just for increased streamflow. Second, the obstacles to 
increasing instream uses include the perception in agricultural communities that they have 
nothing to gain and everything to lose when increased streamflow is discussed—even in the 
context of voluntary transactions. As a result, there is frequently strong opposition to reallocation 
of water among agricultural users and rural communities, and this opposition has already 
impeded efforts to increase instream flows.  
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In the sections below, we try to make the case that much more is to be gained, for all 
parties concerned, by promoting the efficient allocation of water both among agricultural and 
other uses, and between those uses and instream uses. Mechanisms to reallocate water that 
involve an expansion of the range of opportunities for all interested parties, rather than as a 
reduction in opportunities or the confiscation of property, are likely to be more successful in the 
long-run.  There is a great deal of uncertainty, and potential for learning-by-doing, regarding 
water transfer mechanisms and the effects of such transactions. We believe that an environment 
in which all parties can explore new and potentially beneficial opportunities will be one that is 
more conducive to progress than an environment which gives the appearance of placing limits 
on, or directing benefits to, one group at the expense of another.  
 
Many of the economic issues raised in this paper are not new, nor are they unique to the 
Pacific Northwest. Indeed, many of the issues have been assessed in other contexts (see, for 
example, Easter et al. 1998). For that reason, this report is not intended to be a comprehensive 
survey of the steps required to make water markets a reality. Many of the important and practical 
issues about how to make water markets function have also been addressed elsewhere. For 
example, see “Saving our streams through water markets: a practical guide” Clay Landry (1998) 
for a very useful discussion. Our goal in this paper is to build on the previous work by offering a 
way to think about broadening the common framework used to approach water transfers in the 
Northwest. 
 
To begin our discussion about means to broaden the framework for water transfers, the 
next section reports on a recent study of the 2001 irrigation curtailment that occurred in the 
Upper Klamath Basin. We then discuss a second example, this time from Salmon Creek in the 
Okanogan River basin in Washington. These case studies highlight both the constraints on, and 
the potential for, more efficient allocation of water. Clearly, not all of the eight conditions listed 
above are fully satisfied in the case of water – or for any other product or resource for that 
matter. In some cases there is no remedy to the problems, or the effect is slight. In many cases, 
however, improvements are possible that could lower the barriers to mutually beneficial 
transactions involving water. We believe these two case studies demonstrate this potential.   
 
Following these illustrative case studies, we return to the eight conditions for efficient 
water markets, and provide a more detailed discussion of each as it pertains to the obstacles that 
limit efficient allocation and transfer of water in the Northwest. A set of provisional 
recommendations for addressing these obstacles is also proposed.  
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III. Illustrations Of Water Allocation Problems And Potential Solutions  
 
A. The Upper Klamath Basin, Oregon 
 
 The Upper Klamath Basin, and the water crisis that occurred there in 2001, illustrate in 
dramatic fashion both the current limitations and future potential for water transfers. The results 
of an economic study of the region are summarized here focusing on the role that water transfers 
might have played in mitigating the socio-economic costs of the irrigation curtailment 
implemented under the requirements of the Endangered Species Act. The analysis provides a 
concrete and striking illustration of the potential benefits from water transfers to both fish and 
farmers by enlarging the set of opportunities for both groups. 
 
 The Upper Klamath Basin includes about 500,000 irrigated acres including about 
200,000 on the Federal Klamath Reclamation Project (“the Project”) (see figure 1). In the 2001 
drought year, the US Fish and Wildlife Service and the National Marine Fisheries Service 
determined that given requirements for lake levels in Upper Klamath Lake and streamflow in the 
Klamath River to meet ESA requirements for endangered suckerfish and coho salmon, that there 
would be little water left to serve the 195,000 acres in the Project. The subsequent dramatic 
economic, social and political fall-out of that decision has been described in detail in the media 
throughout the past year. The economic cost to irrigators from the initial irrigation curtailment –
in the absence of any public or private mitigation – has been estimated at around $33 million. 
Government responses included Federal and State mitigation efforts (primarily well drilling and 
groundwater) as well as emergency payments and compensation. These public responses 
included between $34 and $36 million in federal and state emergency payments to farmers, plus 
an additional $10 million for well drilling and aid to other members of the affected communities.  
 
Closer examination, however, reveals that the farms in the Klamath Project that were cut-
off from irrigation include a disproportionate share of the most productive agricultural lands in 
the region. Based on data for market land prices, soil classification, and crop rotations, the value 
of applying water to the lands in the region is estimated to vary by more than a factor of 20 
between the Class II soils on the Project where potatoes, grains, and alfalfa are grown, and the 
Class V soils in the higher reaches of the watershed dominated by pasture. See Table 1 for a 
breakdown of the value of irrigation water across these different locations and soil classes.  
 
Short-run losses from “surprise” curtailment of irrigation is more costly to irrigators than 
the long-run values reflected in Table 1 because they lose their net revenues but still have “fixed 
costs” including such things as idle capital equipment, taxes and insurance. Estimates of these 
short run losses in Table 2 are shown to be as high as $312 per acre and as low as $25 per acre. 
Thus, the variation in the value of water in irrigation in the Upper Klamath Basin ranges from 
$312 per acre per year under short-run conditions to less than $12 per acre per year in the long-
run. This range, varying by nearly a factor of 25, demonstrates just how important it can be to 
take account of the differences in the value of water at a particular time or place when 
reallocation is at issue.  
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Indeed, analysis based on simulation models of irrigated agriculture in the Upper 
Klamath Basin indicate that the same reductions in irrigation diversions required in 2001 could 
have been achieved at a cost as low as $6.3 million dollars rather than $33 million – a reduction 
in cost of about 80 percent (see Jaeger 2002 forthcoming). In fact there may be other options not 
taken account of by these simulation models that would reduce these costs even further.  
 
In order to achieve this result, however, water must be allocated efficiently. Yet the 
conditions for efficient allocation do not currently exist in the Klamath Basin. Each of the eight 
conditions described above is violated to lesser or greater extents in the Klamath Reclamation 
Project and in the Upper Klamath Basin more generally. Obstacles include:  
 
• Ownership rights to water in the Upper Klamath Basin are not clearly or completely 
specified. The process of adjudicating these water rights is currently in process, but may 
take several years to complete. Conflicts exist between Tribal rights, irrigators rights, and 
instream uses.  
• Rights are poorly specified in some respects, and transferability is uncertain. There is 
confusion across State and Federal jurisdictions regarding the temporary or permanent 
transferability of water among users, especially the possibility of transfers from the 
Federal Reclamation Project to uses outside the Project.  
• Enforcement of water rights does not currently benefit from gauges or metering devices. 
Control and transfers of partial allocations of irrigation water would require installation 
of devices to precisely measure the amount of water applied to different fields, and this 
would involve a significant initial investment.  
• Water is differentiated by location, timing and quality. Water diverted above Upper 
Klamath Lake may affect water quality in the Upper Klamath Lake and Klamath River. 
Water diverted into portions of the Project contribute runoff that is beneficial to the 
National Wildlife Refuge. Early spring water may be more beneficial to some agricultural 
crops whereas water in mid- and late-summer may be more critical to fish.  
• Information about the willingness of irrigators to transfer water at different times and 
locations to other irrigators or for instream uses is not easily available. And the value of 
being able to apply water on a particular plot of land at a particular time is likely to be 
known only to the individual farmer.  
• The resources used in combination with water to produce agricultural products and 
income are relatively immobile. When water is unavailable, capital equipment, labor and 
the local economies dependent on agriculture suffer from a decline in demand and 
underutilization. Although some farm labor may find work elsewhere, these relocations 
are costly. (Of course, a similar immobility makes fish and other species dependent on 
adequate supplies of water in particular locations at particular times.)  
 
In general, not only are there serious shortcoming with respect to the efficiency of 
property rights for water, but markets for water do not exist at this time. The 2001 restrictions on 
irrigation to protect endangered fish were imposed directly on the Federal Reclamation Project in 
large part because that was the place where federal agencies had the authority to do so. Since the 
Project lands are among the most productive in the region so that the costs imposed by this shut 
down were very high. However, had there been markets for water, the irrigators on the Project 
might have had the option of replacing the water denied them by the Bureau of Reclamation with 
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water purchased from other irrigators who are not part of the federal project – especially if the 
value of water when used on those non-Project lands are significantly lower than the value of 
water when used on the Project.  The data in tables 1 and 2 indicates that the differences in these 
values are very large.  
 
To allocate water efficiently in the Upper Basin, some kind of market mechanism is 
needed, one that utilizes detailed information about the differences in the value of water across 
different locations, soil classes, and crops: the kind of knowledge that only irrigators can be 
expected to possess.  Since farmers are in the best position to know the value of water when used 
on their own lands, a decentralized mechanism that relies on their knowledge and choices—such 
as a water bank or market—is likely be the most efficient way to take advantage of these 
differences.1 
 
The obstacles to a functioning market for water in the Klamath basin include the lack of 
fully-adjudicated water rights in the region, multiple jurisdictions involving the State of Oregon, 
State of California, federal control of the Klamath Reclamation Project, and Tribal rights. In 
addition, many Project irrigators are wary that if some irrigators were able to sell their water 
rights off-Project (for example to instream uses), that the burden of operating and maintenance 
costs (e.g., for canals) would fall more heavily on those remaining, thereby raising their overhead 
costs. Community members, agricultural input suppliers, and processors, also fear that transfers 
of water to instream uses would undermine the local economy and the viability of agriculture in 
the region.  
 
Despite these constraints and concerns, the analysis suggests if some water transfer 
mechanisms could be put in place to achieve more efficient allocation of water, the costs of a 
drought situation like the one in 2001 could be reduced by 80% compared to a “no-reallocation” 
scenario. This result however would require the completion of the water rights adjudication 
process and it would benefit from the installation of meters and gauges to accurately monitor and 
control water use. The 2001 reduction in irrigation was equivalent to a reduction in irrigated 
acreage of 180,000 acres. This same reduction, if achieved using water markets or water banks, 
would allow growers on the Project to offer to buy water from growers outside the Project. The 
economic data suggests that many individuals who irrigate Class V pastures would likely be 
willing to sell their water to irrigators, and that both buyers and sellers would benefit 
significantly from these transactions. The result of these transactions (whether negotiated 
collectively through the irrigation districts or by the Bureau of Reclamation for the entire 
Project) would bring water to the high value lands on the Project while leaving areas of low 
value pasture un-irrigated.  The resulting efficient allocation would involve moving water from 
the upper portions of the Basin (the Sprague, Williamson and Wood Rivers) into Upper Klamath 
Lake, and then into the canals of the Project at the outlet of Upper Klamath Lake.  
 
                                                 
1 While farmers are in the best position to know the value of water when used to irrigate their land, they often are 
unsure of the market value of their water if put to other uses. In some cases irrigators may be willing to sell water at 
a price corresponding to its value to them. In other settings they will want to know what the going rate is, based on 
information about potential buyers, other sellers, and the kinds of uses to which land and water will be put (e.g., 
residential, industrial, instream).  
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This particular kind of transfer would be unlikely to create injury to intermediate 
irrigators because it moves additional water downstream (Injury is more likely if the point of 
diversion is moved upstream.) It would also generate additional biological benefits for fish since 
it would mean more water being kept instream (and in lake) for a longer period of time. Clearly 
this kind of movement of water from individual irrigators on the Sprague or Williamson River to 
the Project would require the collective involvement of the US Bureau of Reclamation who 
operates the canal gates, and also the various irrigation districts within the Project who oversee 
the distribution of water among fields. Therefore it would be essential to involve the collective 
representatives of the Irrigation Districts. In this kind of situation a water bank, which involves a 
cooperative or collective allocation arrangement, is likely to be an attractive alternative (See 
Bromley 2000). This would give the District the ability to negotiate collectively, and to buy or 
sell water on behalf of its members.   
 
 The irrigation curtailment of 2001 imposed a very large cost on the communities in the 
Upper Klamath Basin, and this event represents one way to provide additional water for fish. 
What is also very clear from this analysis, however, is that the way in which efforts were made to 
protect fish imposed unnecessarily high costs on the local communities (as well as on taxpayers 
who financed more than $45 million in emergency payments and mitigation efforts). The 
introduction of water transfer mechanisms in this particular case represents a way to avoid these 
kinds of very high costs on agriculture, while also offering a mechanism for protecting fish and 
other ecological benefits in direct and indirect ways, at much lower costs.  
 
This is a very important point given the very large costs imposed on these communities in 
2001 and the need to provide flows to achieve ecological goals. To the extent that water transfers 
can reduce the costs of irrigation reductions like the one that occurred in 2001, the political 
opposition by farming communities to protecting instream resources is likely to lessen. The 
threat of an action which will cost $6.3 million to the area is likely to get a very different 
response than one that will cost at least $33 million. Moreover, given the uncertainty faced by 
junior water right holders in the area (in the face of drought and conflicting biological opinions 
about the precise requirements necessary to comply with the ESA), there will likely also be a 
role for permanent retirement of irrigated lands. This kind of proposal, however, also raises 
concerns in the local community.  
 
The permanent retirement of irrigation water rights will increase instream flows in all 
years, but it will also reduce the frequency of additional restrictions on the remaining irrigators in 
the region. The fear that permanent retirement of irrigated lands in the area poses a threat to the 
viability of the agricultural community is probably not serious when talking about, say, a 20 
percent reduction in irrigated acreage. A water market would facilitate finding the least-cost way 
to reduce irrigation diversions, and in the case of the Upper Klamath Basin, it is estimated that a 
20 percent reduction in irrigation diversions would reduce incomes from irrigated agriculture in 
the region by only about 10 percent (by retiring the least productive lands). This level of 
reduction is unlikely to produce significant contractions in the local economy, especially if it 
occurs gradually over a period of a few years.  
 
 A central point of this illustration is that water markets can benefit all users, or potential 
users, of water. By focusing on how water transfers can benefit both agricultural and in-stream  
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uses, the objections to water transfers in rural areas are likely to be reduced, and those concerned 
with instream uses and irrigation can potentially work together in a constructive manner.  
 
Indeed, during recent negotiations on the US Farm Bill, an amendment that would have 
provided $150 million for purchase of water rights to protect fish and other species was strongly 
opposed by the farm lobby because of the widespread view that these kinds of voluntary 
transactions pose a serious threat to rural communities and the agricultural industry generally.  
 
 
B. Salmon Creek in the Okanogan Basin, Washington  
 
 In order to restore salmon and steelhead in Salmon Creek, a tributary of the Okanogan 
River in north central Washington, the Colville Confederated Tribes (CCT) and the Okanogan 
Irrigation District (OID) formed a partnership.2 The lower portion of Salmon Creek is dewatered 
in normal years, blocking access to a 12-mile reach of excellent spawning and rearing habitat 
above the dewatered section. The Tribes were interested in restoring salmon and steelhead and 
the OID was interested in continuing to serve the 5,000 acres of orchards and farms. 
 
 In this setting, the lack of clearly defined, individual property right for the Tribes and 
environmental interests meant that their instream uses of water were being adversely affected by 
irrigation uses.  
 
Following a contentious beginning, these two groups began to work together and 
eventually formed a successful partnership. This included a joint study of feasible restoration 
options, funded by BPA and the Washington State Governor’s Salmon Recovery Office. An 
independent consulting firm was hired to conduct the study, and this resulted in a determination 
that 10,000 additional acre feet of water would be needed to meet the needs of irrigators and fish.  
A set of measures were developed, including modifying the district’s water use practices, 
upgrading facilities, and constructing new facilities. Greater flexibility was required, and the 
remedies included allowing water to flow down Salmon Creek under more natural conditions 
(rather than diverting water for irrigation). The Salmon Creek water would be exchanged for 
Okanogan River water which would be pumped back up to the irrigation district. Other elements 
of the project included channel modification, and construction of a fish ladder.  
 
 The irrigation district had not initially viewed water use curtailment due to the ESA as a 
real threat. However, they recognized that other districts had faced large increases in overhead 
(assessments) to deal with planning and legal fees to oppose NMFS and ESA issues. To avoid 
these kinds of costs, the district took a “proactive” approach and entered into the non-binding 
partnership with the tribes to study ways to meet both the needs of irrigators and of fish.  
 
 For their part, the Colville Tribes could have used the courts to assert the federal 
government’s trust responsibilities toward Indian tribes or to assert the tribes’ “Winters’ 
Doctrine” rights on the Okanogan River. They probably understood that they would  prevail in 
court, but that this would require a lengthy and costly court battle. Instead, they elected not to do 
                                                 
2 This section is based primarily on “Irrigators & Tribe Partner to Aid Salmon Recovery in Okanogan River 
Tributary”, by Hilary Lyman, Big River News, volume  (3), 2000 (published by the Northwest Water Law and 
Policy Project).  
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that, and promoted an approach which resolved the conflict sooner and also seems to have built 
some goodwill within the community. Recently the Washington Water Trust has become 
involved as well, creating a Salmon Creek Trust Water Right to protect smolt migration.  
 
 Among other things, this example demonstrates two important points. First, cooperation 
can be successful in situations where confrontation might only have led to impasse. Second, 
water transfers were not the single, or primary tool, in this case. Although a change of diversion 
point was a component of the plan developed, and a transfer of water rights might have been 
considered as a component of alternative versions of the plan, the expected success of this 
arrangement appears to come from a set of complementary tools to resolve disputes involving 
instream and out-of-stream water uses, rather than relying on a single tool such as water 
purchases or leases.  
 
 
IV. Lessons Learned: Obstacles and Recommendations 
 
 We now move to a discussion of how the lessons learned from the two case examples 
discussed in Section III underscore the obstacles facing improved water allocation as they relate 
to the eight conditions for efficient markets listed in Section II. Situations like those in the Upper 
Klamath Basin, in Salmon Creek, and elsewhere help to reinforce the nature of the obstacles, the 
potential gains from flexible approaches, and the ways that specific interventions may help 
overcome some of those obstacles.  
 
Condition 1: Individual Ownership, Control, Impact.  
 
Water use or transfers can affect other individuals. One users action can affect the availability of 
water for other users. This kind of third-party effect or injury arises due to the interdependency 
of flows and diversion at different locations from a common stream. This represents a 
fundamental attribute of water allocation, and thus violates condition #1. This issue is widely 
recognized, and is addressed in Oregon and elsewhere with legal and regulatory conditions for a 
determination of “no-injury.” Unlike other kinds of goods where exclusivity is more 
straightforward, in the case of water there is uncertainty about whether injury may occur. For 
example, if I sell my water right to somebody upstream, there may be a water right holder in-
between the old and the new diversion points who will no longer be able to divert their entire 
amount of water (the streamflow at their diversion point will be insufficient). This potential 
problem can produce high transaction costs related to a determination of whether, or when, 
injury may occur. Some of these costs are born by government regulators (who evaluate 
proposed transfers), but private costs and risks associated with uncertainty are also present for 
potential buyers, sellers, and third-parties. Currently in Oregon and Washington the burden of 
proof requires a “positive finding of non-injury.”   
 
Another kind of third-party effects is relevant to water markets. Water allocation 
infrastructure and procedures sometimes involve common-pool resources where irrigation 
districts manage and maintain commonly used canal and ditches, as well as staff. The timing of 
allocations among participants in a irrigation district also creates the potential for third-party 
effects. If one user sells his water right, the burden of operation and maintenance costs must then 
be born by a smaller group of users, raising the cost per individual. In addition to standard ‘third-
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party’ effects, irrigators are sometimes interdependent in ways that make collective contracting 
appropriate. A common system of canals and ditches, operation, maintenance costs, and complex 
scheduling arrangements, are all ways in which irrigators depend on “common-pool resources” 
associated with water delivery (Bromley 2000). 
 
Recommendation #1: Develop Solutions That Rely On Collaboration And Communication 
with Irrigation Districts, Farmers, and Communities on the Mutual Benefits of Water 
Transfers.  
 
Due to the many ways in which irrigators depend on “common-pool resources”, it is 
essential for those interested in water transfers to work with representatives of a group (such 
as an irrigation district) whenever possible when seeking to develop transactions involving 
the water used by members of this group. Water banks or other ‘clearinghouse’ 
arrangements developed and/or managed at the local level are likely to be viewed as less of a 
threat, have lower transaction costs, and achieve better results for all concerned, than will 
individual contracts in these situations.  
 
Educating and promoting mutually beneficial solutions with irrigation districts is likely to be 
important for locations such as the Upper Klamath Basin, and on Salmon Creek in the 
Okanogan Basin, and elsewhere in the Northwest. Working with state-wide organizations 
such as the Oregon Water Resources Congress and the Washington State Water Resources 
Association (the trade organizations for irrigation districts) may also be beneficial. The 
reluctance of some irrigation districts to work with NGOs or government agencies is often 
due to a lack of familiarity and uncertainty about the potential benefits of these 
collaborations. 
 
Transfers involving Federal irrigation projects present some special legal obstacles. Efforts 
should be made at OWRD and WDOE to remove obstacles for instream transfers involving 
Federal Reclamation Projects. Again, close collaboration aimed at seeking mutually 
beneficial outcomes may help reduce opposition to the resolution of these obstacles. 
 
Condition 2: Complete Specification of Rights. 
 
Ownership rarely means that you can do anything with the item owned. I may own a dog, but I 
cannot torture it. I may own a house, but I cannot set it on fire. A “use-right” for water may be 
defined in terms of a specified amount and diversion point, but it may be poorly defined in terms 
of the flow or duty (volume) that may be transferred from one use to a different use. In fact, 
different specifications may be applied to different uses. For example, many “decree rights” have 
no limit on volume (duty) allowed over the course of a year, whereas a diversion at the 
maximum allowed flow for 365 days in a year could produce a volume many times greater than 
what would reasonably be used in agriculture. These kinds of rights can produce anomalies and 
create loopholes for transfers where out-of-stream consumptive use is unchanged.  
 
The problem of poorly-defined or poorly-specified rights is particularly relevant to 
instream uses. Whether or not the water right amount listed on paper will be transferred to 
instream flow, or whether only the consumptive use amount (the amount previously diverted less 
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the amount returned to the stream by subsurface flows) may be transferred, is a source of 
uncertainty which may discourage potential buyers who are unsure of what they will get from the 
transaction.  
 
This issue is related to the non-injury condition discussed above, where individuals other 
than the owner of the right (the seller) may be penalized by the sale of the right to streamflow 
use. In agricultural diversions, there are frequently subsurface flows from a given diversion that 
return to the stream (water that is not used by the crops). These may provide some instream 
benefits and they may be relied upon for a downstream water right. It is very difficult to know 
how much return flow occurs for a given diversion, and whether that return flow occurs at a time 
when water in or out of stream is scarce. (The return flow may be delayed for months or years in 
some cases). In the case of a water right transfer from agriculture to instream use, it is important 
to determine the amount of return flow that occurred with the agricultural use during the relevant 
time period so that the “net” change in streamflow can be accurately quantified.  
 
This amount will be somewhere between the full diversion amount and the consumptive 
use amount. Using too small an amount will discourage the potential purchaser (instream or out-
of-stream); too large an amount may create injury to downstream junior water right holders. 
Currently the Oregon Water Resources Department is required to make a finding of no-injury to 
allow a water right transfer to proceed, erring on the side of caution. An approach which 
transferred the full paper amount of a water right to instream use would implicitly take the 
opposite starting-point, assuming no injury will occur due to differences between the full paper 
water right and the consumptive use. This alternative approach would essentially reverse the 
burden of proof now being applied by OWRD. Reasonable arguments can be made for both 
approaches. It is currently not clear how this controversial question will be resolved in Oregon. 
But there is economic support for the position that all types of water rights should be treated 
similarly in this regard. If irrigators are generally allowed to transfer the full paper water right 
between different diversion points, then transfers to instream uses should be treated similarly. To 
do otherwise would bias water allocations away from precisely those kinds of beneficial uses 
(the collective or public benefits from instream flows) that tend already to be underprovided by 
market allocations.  
 
It is much easier for water to be transferred within established irrigation districts in 
Washington, as farmers with water rights held by a district can buy and sell water among each 
other. Informal reallocation within districts is also common in Oregon.  
 
The question of the quantity of water pertaining to a given right is also at issue with 
respect to the length of reach in which a given augmentation of streamflow should be ensured 
due to the acquisition of a specified water right. In some circumstances it will be reasonable to 
recognize channel losses over some distance from the previous diversion point, but how those 
channel losses are determined is currently unclear. Transferability is constrained by location, 
geology and landscape, but also by the legitimate concerns in rural communities about how 
reallocation of water might affect their economies.  
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Recommendation #2: Develop and Clarify Standards For Determining How Much Water 
(Flow) Will Be Associated With The Transfer Of A Given Instream Water Right.  
 
State regulators need to develop standards for determining how much water will be 
associated with the transfer of a given instream water right. It is essential that these 
standards are fair to the potential buyer (whether it is an instream or out-of-stream user) 
while at the same time avoid injury to other users. The OWRD’s Transfer Rules Advisory 
Committee is currently looking into these issues, and Oregon Water Trust has submitted a 
proposal to have the full “paper water right” amount be the transferred amount unless injury 
(e.g., corresponding to return flows that would no longer be available to downstream 
users)(see OWT Proposal for Transfer Injury Analysis).  
 
The promotion of fair rules and regulation across types of uses should include allowing in-
district water leasing to apply to instream leasing as well. In this regard, the Deschutes 
Resources Conservancy has proposed that the current legislation (OAR 690-021-000) that 
establishes the conditions that an irrigation district may follow to temporarily change the 
place of use of district-managed water rights be amended to allow for instream transfers 
(Gail Achterman, December 14, 2001, personal communication).  In contrast, water districts 
in Washington can move water any way they want within the district. This flexibility allows 
farmers to buy and sell water to other farmers. In irrigation districts like Roza, for example, 
which has low flows every few years, farmers often buy and sell water among themselves. 
Moving water outside of the boundaries of irrigation districts, however, requires approval 
from WDOE.  
  
These efforts also should promote installation of metering and gauging devices so that more 
precise information about water use, enforcement of water rights, and potential injury can be 
better assessed.  
 
 
Condition #3: Transferability and Low Transaction Cost.  
 
Under Oregon law water rights are transferable among different uses including beneficial 
instream flows. Washington has similar legislation. As a result, in those settings where individual 
water rights are adjudicated, there are no legal obstacles to water market transfers. In some 
regions, however, such as the Upper Klamath Basin, water rights are not yet adjudicated and this 
constrains the ability of water markets to function freely. There are physical limits to the 
transferability of water across different locations due to conveyance costs. More importantly for 
policy purposes are the transaction costs arising in the contracting and regulatory approval 
process for water transfers either temporary or permanent. Transaction costs include gathering of 
information, paperwork, delays, legal costs, or other aspects of a transaction that will diminish 
the attractiveness of the exchange to either the buyer or the seller. If these transaction costs are a 
‘fixed cost’ per transaction, then their importance can be reduced by increasing the size or scope 
of a single transaction. This can make a permanent purchase more attractive than a one-year 
lease; and it can make a transaction involving a large acreage more attractive than one involving 
a small amount of water. Two approaches can be taken to reducing transaction costs: reducing 
the costs per transactions, and increasing the scale or scope of each transaction.  
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One way in which these transaction costs have been lowered in Oregon is the ability to 
renew a one- or two-year lease with a simple, one-page renewal form. This reduces the 
regulatory and processing costs. More generally, familiarity with water rights transactions will, 
over time, lead to efficiency gains, learning-by-doing, and simplification of the procedures which 
now are relatively cumbersome for many participants due to a lack of experience and 
information. 
 
Recommendation #3: Promote The Establishment Of A Centralized, Online Database 
Where Information About Actual Water Transactions Are Summarized And Described. 
 
Water markets are new, and potential buyers and sellers face enormous uncertainty. Unlike 
the market for bread or blue jeans where people know what they are getting, what the price 
should be, and how and where to make the transaction, water presents such a high level of 
uncertainty that many individuals are repelled by those uncomfortable circumstances. 
Whatever can be done to reduce the uncertainty, to provide information about the product, 
the price, and the mechanism for processing a transaction, will reduce these costs and be 
highly beneficial by making individuals more comfortable with this particular kind of 
transaction. Information on actual water transfers can provide useful information and 
reassurances to uncertain participants, in the same way that information about what others 
have paid for a particular used car provide assurances to potential buyers who are hesitant 
because they are not sure that they are getting a good deal.  
 
This information should try to distinguish between market transactions where the price 
reflects the seller’s maximum “willingness-to-accept” price, and others that may reflect a 
very different, and idiosyncratic, willingness-to-pay price (e.g., BPA offers in WA in 2001, 
high-value residential or ‘hobby farms’). One effort to provide broad information of this kind 
is the OregonWaterRights.com (sponsored by Groundwater Solutions, Schwabe, Williamson 
& Wyatt, LLP, in cooperation with the Deschutes Water Exchange). Other similar sites 
include WaterStrategist.com and WaterExchange.com.  A public site, for example maintained 
by a State agency, may also be desirable.  
 
Recommendation #4: Experiment With Flexible Contracts Such As Dry-Year Options and 
split-season transfers 
 
Where the value of water instream is higher than its value out-of-stream only in drought 
years, contingent markets or ‘dry year options’ should be developed. This can make 
augmenting streamflow attractive in situations where it otherwise would not be (e.g., if 
permanent purchases were the only alternative, or where repeated, single-year leases had to 
be renegotiated every time a dry year occurred). This kind of contract will not be appropriate 
where dry streambeds exist in late summer every year: in those cases permanent purchases 
are a more appropriate type of arrangement. In some cases, also, the option may run in the 
opposite direction. A water right may be purchased for instream use, but with an option for 
out-of-stream use under specified circumstances. These arrangements are important where 
the value of water in one use or the other is uncertain and fluctuates from year to year.  
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The Oregon Water Trust has developed a arrangement that mimics a dry-year lease.  In 
1998, OWT negotiated a 10-year deal with an irrigator in the Walla Walla Basin who grows 
spring wheat and peas.  Irrigation only happens in dry springs, otherwise the crops do fine 
as dryland crops.  Based on field data, OWT projected that in 3 out of 10 years the irrigator 
would have needed to water the fields in order to avoid reductions in productivity.  OWT 
then projected, with the help of OSU Extension, how much production would be lost and the 
value of that lost production.  OWT also subtracted out the costs of irrigating from the total.  
They then made a one-time payment to the right holder to exercise an option upfront on the 
projected dry years during a 10 year period.  In essence, OWT has a 10 year lease with 
payments occurring for 3 of the 10 years and a donation occurring the other 7 (personal note 
from Andrew Purkey, OWT Executive Director, June 2002). 
 
Split season transfers may also offer significant potential for benefits because they take 
advantage of differences in the marginal value of water at different times within a given 
season. To the extent that one or more users of water can shift the timing of their use (earlier 
or later) toward a time when water is more abundant, this may be a way to resolve conflicts 
over water at a much lower cost than a full-season transfer from one use to another. For 
example, water can offer benefits to irrigators in the early part of the growing season and 
then be transferred to instream use during the minimum flow period later in the summer. The 
potential benefits of this kind of reallocation may be substantial. For example, when the 
irrigation curtailment in the Klamath Reclamation Project was announced in 2001, some 
irrigators were able to “pre-irrigate” prior to the introduction of the curtailment. Since the 
soil profiles on these lands were fully saturated, grains and pasture were able to be grown 
without further irrigation on about 17,000 acres obtaining normal yields per acre. This 
approach is essentially an alternative to water storage, and may be especially beneficial in 
areas where water storage is not an option, but where shifting agricultural demand forward 
in  time can reduce conflicts with summer low flow periods which may be critical to instream 
uses.  
 
These kinds of arrangements face few obstacles currently under Oregon law and regulations. 
Oregon currently has a range of mechanisms for short-term instream leasing, pooled 
landowner leasing, district leasing, renewal for prior lease, and split season leases, as well 
as a conserved water program (which allows the landowner to use a portion of the conserved 
water). Washington has many similar mechanisms. 
 
Transfers involving both instream and out-of-stream uses in which priority dates are 
‘swapped’ may offer benefits in some areas. Contract payments can be based on the 
probable frequency that one or another contingent situation will arise. These kinds of 
agreements may have widespread potential.  
 
 
Condition #4: Enforcement.  
 
The transfer of water rights, especially for instream uses, is constrained in some areas by 
inadequate monitoring, which in turn limits enforcement. Our review of water acquisitions in 
Washington State in 2001 found that, except in the federal project in the Yakima basin,  visual 
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monitoring was used almost exclusively. While appropriate given the crisis nature of the drought 
occurring at the time, visual monitoring alone will probably not satisfy those concerned with 
water transfers in the long-run, The lack of metering and gauging infrastructure limits the ability 
of water masters to adequately monitor the allocation of water, and the protection of the rights of 
both out-of-stream and instream rights. The installation of meters and gauges does not present a 
large cost compared to the value of water for most agricultural uses (usually far less than $1 per 
acre per year). As water becomes relatively more scarce, the waste and lack of accuracy using 
informal metering approaches will become increasingly unsatisfactory. The sooner a move 
toward meters and gauges is initiated, the sooner water right buyers and sellers can enter into 
contracts with a higher degree of confidence about what is being transacted. The State of Oregon 
has the ability to require that meters and gauges be installed at diversion points (Reed Marbit, 
OWRD, personal communication). Activities such as the grant received by the Oregon Water 
Trust to install a gauging station on Squaw Creek can contribute toward improved information 
about flows. Real-time on-line monitoring of instream flows and diversions is a reality in many 
Northwest locations.  In the federal Yakima project in Washington there is a well-developed 
system of stream gauges, because court ordered flows have been established. Elsewhere in 
Washington, stream monitoring is spotty. 
 
Recommendation #5: Improve the Monitoring and Gauging Infrastructure 
 
The lack of metering and gauging infrastructure, which hinders monitoring and enforcement, 
may seriously reduce the comfort level of all parties as to the mutual benefits of water 
transfers. Government agencies should work with irrigation districts, non-profits, and others 
to expand and improve the metering and gauging infrastructure as rapidly as possible.  
 
Condition #5: Standardized Product & Condition #6: Perfect Information. 
 
Water is clearly not a standardized product. A given water right is associated with a 
specific location, at specific times, and with specific characteristics (temperature, nutrient 
content, etc.). Thus, we must recognize that a single, integrated market for the allocation of water 
cannot exist. Rather, there is the potential for many, highly differentiated water markets; some 
with many potential buyers and sellers, some with perhaps one or two. This reality has 
consequences for condition #6, because information is likely to be highly location specific, 
which makes it harder for potential buyers and sellers to feel confident that they have enough 
information to make and informed decision about entering into a contract, or making an offer. 
Unlike the market for a new car where it is easy to know exactly what the going price is, what 
the specifications of the product are, and how satisfied other consumers have been with a given 
product, information about water transfers and uses in other locations may be of limited use in 
evaluating a specific transaction. 
 
Especially in the case of a commodity for which individuals have little market 
experience, the uncertainty created by ignorance about market values, what buyers (sellers) 
should be willing to offer (accept), makes risk averse individuals very cautions and unwilling to 
make transactions.  
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Some characteristics of a specific water right are known and these can be helpful (e.g., 
priority date). But a lack of easily available market information about similar transactions 
involving water rights gives rise to a high level of uncertainty, and therefore considerable 
hesitancy, on the part of both potential sellers and potential buyers.  
 
Recommendation #6 (Repeat of #3): Promote The Establishment Of A Centralized, Online 
Database Where Information About Actual Water Transactions Are Summarized And 
Described. (Details presented above)  
 
Condition #7: Market Power and Condition #8: Mobile Resources 
 
Given the highly-differentiated and location-specific nature of most water markets, there 
is a clear risk of market power being exercised. This means the possibility exists for one or more 
individuals to act in a way that can influence the market price, and in so doing affect the 
opportunities of other buyers and sellers in the market. There is a fear, especially in some 
agricultural communities, that water purchases to augment streamflow could lead to water being 
controlled or monopolize by non-agricultural users such as urban areas. The implications of this 
possibility, real or imagined, is highly relevant to condition #8. 
 
Many of the resources used in conjunction with water in agriculture are not mobile (such 
as buildings and other infrastructure, but perhaps more importantly, the less tangible assets such 
as the communities themselves that are highly valued by their members). Since there are no close 
substitutes for water in a given location, the threat of market control or loss of control, especially 
when putting water to other uses, could have a dramatic effect on a community, is a threat that 
must be taken seriously. This kind of threat represents a “third-party effect” of a kind that is not 
protected under water law in Oregon or Washington. Only injury to other water right holders is 
considered by WRD in Oregon and DOE Washington. If a significant share of water rights is 
transferred to non-agricultural uses, then individuals in that community (such as the fertilizer 
distributor, tractor mechanic) may be adversely affected and even lose their livelihood.  
  
More than any of the other conditions described here, the combination of conditions #7 
and #8 give rise to many of the social and political constraints—and hostility—toward water 
markets and instream transfers. In order to reduce these fears, and to the extent that they are 
unwarranted, more information is needed on exactly how water right transfers have affected (will 
affect) communities. Moreover, if agricultural communities only see the possibility of an adverse 
impact on them, then they have no reason to look at water transfers favorably. Therefore, it is 
very important to demonstrate to these groups the ways in which water transfers can benefit them 
as well.  
 
For example, although there has been a 300 percent increase in instream leasing since 
1998 (from 6 leases in 1994 to 151 in 2001), a large majority of these leases involved no 
compensation. The incentive for a majority of these was to avoid losing a water right due to non-
use. Therefore, the majority of recent leases were undertaken because the water right holder 
benefited directly from the arrangement. Aside from water donations of this kind, the large 
majority of the remaining of lease arrangements involving payment are those initiated by Oregon 
Water Trust. This type of information must be widely shared with the irrigated community. 
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Of course, without water in a particular location fish may also be unable to relocate to 
different habitats, and other fish populations may not be substitutable (in terms of their 
ecological or social values) for the population in a particular location.  Thus, instream uses are 
also location specific and lack resource mobility.  
 
Recommendation #7: Significantly Upgrade Outreach and Communication Efforts  
 
There is strong evidence that many of the skeptical or hostile reactions to water transfers in 
rural and agricultural communities can be replaced with cooperative, proactive approaches 
to conflict resolution with detailed information, examples of success, and better 
communication.  
 
The full potential for expanding the framework for water transfers will be achieved only 
when most of those involved in the issue develop a common understanding of its benefits. 
Achieving a shared understanding of the potential benefits is very difficult, especially when 
people are skeptical. Getting a hundred, or 1000 people to understand and accept new 
information is an enormously challenging undertaking. It requires extensive communication 
delivered through multiple channels. It also requires that people walk the talk and avoid 
inconsistent messages.  
 
People often vastly underestimate the importance of, or level of, work required to 
successfully communicate this type of information to irrigators, non-profits, government 
employees, stakeholders, and community members. This can delay or stop efforts to expand 
the framework for water transfers. Effective communication programs have been shown to be 
those that involve presentations designed to be accessible to all audiences, include examples 
and illustrations, and where presentations are made repeatedly and in multiple forums.  
 
An Additional Issue 
 
There is one additional obstacle facing potential instream users. There is simply an 
overwhelming lack of knowledge about the ecological benefits of incremental instream flows for 
any given reach in any given season or year. Given a budget with which to lease or buy water 
rights for instream use, there is very little information on which to make judgments about getting 
the most ecological benefit. Although most irrigators have a good idea about the value of water 
to them, potential buyers of water rights for instream uses are largely playing a guessing game.  
 
Recommendation #8: Conduct Additional Research And Develop Careful Monitoring 
Programs Of The Biological Effects Of Changes In Streamflow.  
 
Unlike irrigators who have a great deal of information on which to base their judgments of 
the value of water in agriculture, the value of incremental changes in streamflow in a given 
reach and for a given year is highly uncertain. That asymmetry puts instream users at a 
disadvantage, but this is not so much a regulatory, policy, or legal issue, as it is an 
ignorance issue pure and simple.  
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Additional research by fish biologists, combined with systematic long-term monitoring of fish 
populations in streams where changes have occurred (both increases and decreases) would 
appear to be the only way to gradually make judgments about when and where money is well 
spent protecting minimum flows. In the absence of careful monitoring using standard 
scientific methods and experimental design, this uncertainty will not be significantly reduced.   
 
In the near-term, it makes sense to target situations where the benefits are most obvious such 
as fish-bearing streams that go completely dry on an annual basis, or ones where water 
temperatures regularly exceed lethal levels.  
 
It should be kept in mind, however, that a correlation between minimum streamflow and fish 
abundance may not represent a large benefit if fish are merely moving from, or to, nearby 
tributaries or reaches.  
 
 
VI. Concluding Comments  
 
There is no single recipe for reducing impediments for water transfers. Different situations 
require different approaches. In some cases the constraint that is most limiting may be a lack of 
information or high coordination costs among individual water rights holders. In other cases the 
binding constraint may be a shortcoming in the regulatory framework used by government.  Few 
quick fixes are apparent in Oregon and Washington, in part because the regulatory framework 
appears to be relatively conducive to water transfers and instream beneficial use.  
 
One factor, however, remains a significant barrier--the perception by many irrigators that 
water transfers usually result in the loss of an economic asset to enhance a public resource.  This 
report has tried to suggest that one key to expanding water transfers in the region is to reframe the 
goal, when possible, as a means to help farmers and other water right holders meet their 
economic needs while also benefiting instream uses. While this approach will certainly not be 
possible at all times and in all locations, it is much more likely to achieve mutually beneficial 
results for farmers, communities, fish, and the environment when it is pursued.  
 
  
 
Figure 1. Key features and irrigated areas in the upper Klamath Basin and River system. 
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Table 1. Long-run marginal value of irrigation water in the Upper Klamath Basin by location 
and soil type. (annual values per acre estimated from market land values) 
 ($ per acre per year)       
  Soil Class: II III IV V Average 
       (weighted) 
Areas above Upper Klamath Lake:      
 Fort Klamath Valley*  -- 42 27 12 17 
 Modoc Point to Chiloquin  78 42 27 12 41 
 Sprague River Valley  -- 48 33 6 33 
 North Country  -- 33 33 3 31 
        
Areas east and south of Upper Klamath Lake     
 Swan Lake Valley  114 75 33 10 55 
 Bonanza (nonproject)  114 75 33 10 70 
 Langell Valley (nonproject)  114 75 33 10 67 
 Poe Valley (nonproject)  138 66 42 12 76 
 West of 97 to Keno (nonproject) 78 42 27 12 38 
 Lower Klamath Lake (non-project) 138 96 42 0 93 
        
Klamath Reclamation Project Areas       
 Merril-Malin area  138 63 42 12 64 
 Poe Valley  138 66 42 12 76 
 Midland-Henley-Olene  138 66 42 12 73 
 Bonanza-Dairy-Hildebrand  114 75 33 10 70 
 Langell Valley  114 75 33 10 67 
 Lower Klamath Lake  138 96 42   
 Malin Irrigation District  144 102 48 6 104 
 Shasta View District  144 69 48 6 79 
 West of 97 to Keno  78 42 27 12 38 
 Tule Lake / California portion 138 90 48 -- 87 
        
Shasta & Scott Valleys  102 81 45 -- 68 
        
Average (weighted)      60 
Average (unweighted)   103 68 37 9  
        
Estimates from Malheur County, Oregon**  $105 $67 $35 $32  
                
*  Values based on agricultural use. Recreational demand has raised land values in this area. 
** Based on hedonic price analysis (Faux and Perry 1999).     
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Table 2. Losses per acre from irrigation curtailment      
    ($ per acre per year)   
  Soil 
Class: 
II III IV V Average 
       (weighted) 
Areas above Upper Klamath Lake:      
 Fort Klamath Valley  -- 67 52 37 42 
 Modoc Point to Chiloquin  232 182 52 37 131 
 Spraque River Valley  -- 210 58 31 59 
 North Country  -- 58 58 28 56 
        
Areas east and south of Upper Klamath Lake     
 Swan Lake Valley  236 162 58 35 110 
 Bonanza (nonproject)  309 260 58 35 199 
 Langell Valley (nonproject)  242 106 58 35 115 
 Poe Valley (nonproject)  297 158 67 37 159 
 West of 97 to Keno (nonproject) 206 134 52 37 100 
 Lower Klamath Lake (non-project) 307 159 67 25 155 
        
Klamath Irrigation Project 
Areas 
      
 Merril-Malin area  312 232 67 37 193 
 Poe Valley  297 158 67 37 159 
 Midland-Henley-Olene  297 247 67 37 201 
 Bonanza-Dairy-Hildebrand  309 260 58 35 199 
 Langell Valley  242 106 58 35 115 
 Lower Klamath Lake  307 159 67 25 155 
 Malin Irrigation District  295 243 73 31 242 
 Shasta View District  299 217 211 31 232 
 West of 97 to Keno  206 134 52 37 100 
 Tule Lake / California 
portion 
 259 211 73 25 182 
        
Shasta & Scott Valleys  273 228 70 -- 167 
        
 Averages for non-California areas: $274 $173 $69 $33 $145 
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